Courting kazaa : judicial approaches towards P2P networks in the US and Australia by Antons, Christoph
          Deakin Research Online 
 
This is the published version:  
 
Antons, Christoph 2006, Courting kazaa : judicial approaches towards P2P networks in the 
US and Australia, Computer law review international, no. 3, pp. 70-76.                            
 
Available from Deakin Research Online: 
 
http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30039995 
 
Every reasonable effort has been made to ensure that permission has been obtained for items 
included in Deakin Research Online. If you believe that your rights have been infringed by 
this repository, please contact drosupport@deakin.edu.au 
 
Copyright : 2006, Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt KG 
70 Antons CRi 3/2006 
Courting Kazaa - Judicial Approaches Towards P2P Networks in the US and Australia 
VI. Conclusion 
Google's Book Search project has been hit by lawsuits in 
the United States because rights holders feared the 
infringement of their exclusive rights, and undoubtedly 
Google and others would face similar lawsuits here in 
Europe if it were to start digiti sing content from libraries 
in a similar manner. It is unfortunate that the harmoni-
sed rules of the Copyright Directive have created a rigid 
system of copyright exceptions for the whole of Europe 
that do not allow for the flexibility needed to accommo-
date for new technologies and products such as those 
developed by Google, Yahoo! and Microsoft (the two 
latter via the OCA initiative). 
The benefits of moving books and other similar content 
online and therefore within everybody's reach cannot be 
doubted, however. The new book search products, as 
well as the Commission's digital libraries initiative, 
promise to bring a whole new dimension to the way we 
currently access information, and thus, provided that 
rights holders' interests are not harmed in the process, 
the introduction of such products should not be hin-
dered by restrictive copyright rules not designed for such 
purposes. However, the rules as they are set out in the 
Copyright Directive (and implemented in national 
laws), bar the way to digital library and book search pro-
jects in Europe. Steps need to be taken to open it, but 
consideration should be given to the viability of the dif-
ferent options proposed. Two possible, though not nec-
essarily only, solutions, would be the encouraging of the 
adoption of digital rights management solutions to allay 
the fears of many rights holders, and introducing a new 
copyright exception in the EC, namely a European Fair 
Use exception. The latter solution would undoubtedly 
not be easy, and would have rather far reaching implica-
tions to copyright law in general. 
Christoph Antons 
Courting Kazaa - Judicial Approaches Towards P2P Networks in the 
US and Australia 
As with the litigation involving its predecessor Napstet; 
cases involving the Australian based P2P service Kazaa 
and its US licensees Grokster and Morpheus required 
from the courts to balance the legitimate interests of the 
computer industry and the public in new and advanced 
technologies on the one hand and of so-called "content 
providers" of the media and entertainment industry on 
the other hand. The article examines, how US and Aus-
tralian courts have approached this task and, in spite of 
differences in the legal frameworks of the two countries, 
have reached similar conclusions. 
I. Introduction 
1. Copyright in the Information Society 
Since the advent of the computer industry and of digital 
technology, copyright lawyers have been struggling with 
the consequences of the new technology for a wide variety 
of works. During the 1990s, these consequences came to 
be addressed at the national and international level 
through new legislation and international agreements. 
The WTO-TRIPS Agreement of 1994 required national 
governments to protect computer programs as literary 
works within the Berne Convention, to protect compila-
tions of data under certain circumstances and to provide 
rental rights for owners of copyright in computer pro-
grams, cinematographic works and phonograms.' Two 
subsequent treaties negotiated under the auspices of the 
World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) 
addressed the so-called 'digital agenda'. The WIPO 
Copyright Treaty of 1996 included, among other things, 
a new 'communication right', which referred to the exclu-
sive rights of the copyright owner to make works avail-
able to members of the public in such a way that they may 
access the work from a place and time individually chosen 
by them. The WIPO Performances and Phonogram 
Treaty contains a similar right of 'making available' spe-
cifically for performers and phonogram producers.2 
Around the same time as these international treaties 
were concluded, the digital agenda was also pursued at 
the national level. The US 'National Information Infra-
structure' was set up in 1994 and produced a White 
Paper in 19953 and in 1998, the US Digital Millenium 
Copyright Act (DMCA) was enacted.4 The EC issued a 
number of copyright related directives during the 1990s, 
culminating in the Information Society Directive of 
2001.5 In Australia, the Copyright Convergence Group 
issued its report in 1994 and many of its recommenda-
tions were implemented in the Copyright Amendment 
(Digital Agenda) Act 2000, which entered into force in 
2001.6 
2. Balancing the Interests of Technology 
Suppliers and Content Providers 
With the new communication right thus firmly entren-
ched at the national and international level, the attention 
shifted to various new forms of infringement and to the 
liability of various actors for copyright infringing acts. 
In this context, a line of cases involving so called peer-to-
peer (P2P) file sharing services assumed particular 
importance. The sharing of music files between individ-
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uals using networked computers has alarmed the music 
industry in particular. In a two-pronged approach, they 
have started suing individual users of P2P technology as 
well as the technology providers. 7 In particular in the 
Anglo-American jurisdictions, they rekindled a debate 
about the liability for copyright infringement of provid-
ers and suppliers of enabling technology. Ultimately, in 
this area, the courts have to undertake a delicate balanc-
ing act by trying to protect copyright holders but with-
out discouraging the further development of dseful tech-
nologies, even if these technologies can also be used for 
infringing purposes. In the US, the standards for this 
exercise had been set in the decision of Sony Corp of 
America v. Universal Studios, Inc. 8 concerning the Beta-
max video recorder. The court imported the so-called 
"staple article of commerce" doctrine from US patent 
law in finding that the manufacturer or supplier of a 
technological product "capable of substantial non-
infringing uses", even with constructive knowledge of 
~he .infringement, would not be liable for copyright 
mfnngement.9 In Australia, the seminal case concerning 
'authorisation' of copyright infringements is University 
of New South Wales v. Moorhouse. 10 Liability of the uni-
v.ersity in this case was based on the insufficient supervi-
SlOn of a photocopier on its premises, which had been 
used for the making of copyright infringing copies. 11 Dif-
ferent from the US, however, statutory definitions of 
'authorisation without licence' for the original works of 
Part III and for the "subject-matter other than works" 
(including sound recordings) of Part IV of the Australian 
Copyright Act of 1968 have been introduced by the 
Copyright (Digital Agenda) Amendment Act of 2000. 12 
The remainder of this paper will analyse how the courts 
7 A.M. Witt, "Burned in the USA: Should the Music Industry Ultilize its 
American Strategy of Suing Users to Combat Online Piracy in Europe?", 
11 Colum. J. Eur. L. 375 at 379-382. Observers have pointed out that 
the former approach was increasingly adopted in the US following the 
unsuccessful litigation against Grokster at first instance and at the 
appeal stage, ].M. Moye, "How Sony Survived: Peer-to-Peer Software, 
Grokster, and Contributory Copyright Liability in the Twenty-First 
Century", 84 N.C.L. Rev 646 at 672. 
8 464 US 417. 
9 ]. C. Ginsburg/S. Ricketson, "Inducers and authorisers: A comparison of 
the US Supreme Court's Grokster decision and the Australian Federal 
Court's KaZaa ruling", (2006) 11 Media and Arts Law Review, p. 3; P. 
Ganley, "Surviving Grokster: Innovation and the Future of Peer-ta-
Peer", E.I.P.R. 2006, 28( 1), p. 15. 
10 (1975) 133 CLR 1. 
11 See]. C. Ginsburg/S. Ricketson, "Inducers and authorisers: A compari-
son of the US Supreme Court's Grokster decision and the Australian 
Federal Court'sKaZaa ruling", (2006) 11 Media and Arts Law Review, 
p. 11-13; R. Giblin-Chen/M. Davison, "Kazaa goes the way of Groks-
ter? Authorisation of copyright infringement via peer·to-peer networks 
III Australia', (2006) 17 AlP] 53. 
12 See s. 36( lA) and s. 101 (lA) ofrhe Copyright Act. See further]. C. Gins-
burg/So Ricketson, "Inducers and authorisers: A comparison of the US 
Supreme Court's Grokster decision and the Australian Federal Court's 
KaZaa ruling", (2006) 11 Media and Arts Law Review, pp. 13-14. 
13 443 F2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971). 
14 A6M Record Inc 11. Napster Inc. 239F 3d 1004 (9th Cir 2001), at 1019. 
15 Ibid., at 1022. See also D.G. Post, "His Napster's Voice', in A. Thierer 
and C.W. Crews Jr. (eds.), Copyfights - The Future ofIntellectual Prop-
erty in the Information Age, Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute 2002, 
pp.11-12. 
16 Ibid., at 1020-102l. 
17 Ibid., at 1014-1015 and 1018-1019. 
18 Ibid., at 1020. 
19 Ibid. at 1022. See further M.]acksonIM. Shelly, "Black Hats and White 
Hats: Authorisation of Copyright Infringement in Australia and the 
UnIted States', 14 Int'I].L & Info Tech 28 at 33 citing Fonovisa, [,Ie. ". 
Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996). 
20 239 F 3d, at 1024. 
21 Ibid., at 1027. 
have approached this difficult balancing act between the 
computer industry and the so-called "content provid-
ers" of the media and entertainment industry in the US 
and in Australia. 
n. P2P Litigation in the US 
1. First Generation of P2P Services 
The first of the P2P services, 'Napster' was famously 
shut down after the US 9th Circuit Court confirmed a 
preliminary injunction of the District Court for the 
Northern District of California that prima facie the ser-
vice had contributed to copyright infringement. The 
court cited the 1971 case of Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. 
Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc, 11 for the traditional con-
tributory copyright infringement doctrine that "one 
who with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces: 
causes or materially contributes to the infringing con-
duct of another, may be held as a 'contributory 
infringer'."14 With Napster's material contribution to 
the infringement not in doubt, the Ninth Circuit found 
further that Napster had actual knowledge of the 
infringing activities because it had received actual notice 
about them from record companies, it had the ability to 
block access to its system by the suppliers of the infring-
ing material and it had failed to remove the material 
from its system. IS Napster's attempt to counter the claim 
of contributory infringement by pointing to the decision 
in Sony Corp of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 
failed. The Ninth Circuit Court made it plain that it did 
not want to "impute the requisite level of knowledge to 
Napster merely because peer-to-peer file sharing tech-
nology may be used to infringe plaintiffs' copyright and 
that the District Court had placed undue weight on the 
proportion of current infringing use as compared to cur-
rent and future non-infringing use." 16 However, it distin-
guished Napster from Sony mainly on two grounds: 
while the users in Sony were engaging in fair use ("time 
shifting" referring to the recording of a television pro-
gram for later viewing), Napster failed to establish that 
the file sharing by its millions of users came under the 
fair use defence. 17 In addition, the Sony case was found 
to be of only limited assistance to Napster because of the 
file sharing services' actual knowledge of the direct 
infringements of its users. IS Apart from contributory lia-
bility, US law allows the injured copyright holder further 
to base the claim on vicarious liability of the defendant. 
This applies where the defendant has the right and abil-
ity to supervise the infringing activities and a direct 
financial interest in them. 19 In this regard, the Ninth Cir-
cuit found that "Napster's failure to police the system's 
'premises', combined with a showing that Napster 
financially benefits from the continuing availability of 
infringing files on its system, leads to the imposition of 
vicarious liability. "20 Napster had "both the ability to 
use its search function to identify infringing musical 
recordings and the right to bar participation of users 
who engage in the transmission of infringing files" .21 
Thus, Napster's central indexing server that enabled it to 
supervise the activities of its users and its actual knowl-
edge of the infringing activities became its downfall. 
2. Second Generation of P2P Services 
Because of this central server, Napster was not a "pure" 
P2P service. Predictably, in view of the outcome in this 
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case, the next generation of P2P services attempted to 
place the file sharing of their users beyond their control 
by eliminating the necessity of a central server.22 Kazaa 
and its US licensees Grokster and Morpheus used a 
decentralised network of nodes and regional supernodes 
to further improve and speed up the file sharing process 
and to allow for direct sharing of files between users, to 
which they merely provided the enabling softwareY 
a) District Court's Approach 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer and other companies represent-
ing the motion pictures and music recording industries 
took action in 2003 against Grokster, Ltd. and its affili-
ate Stream Cast Networks, Inc. in the US District Court 
of California.24 Citing Sony and finding that the technol-
ogy was capable of substantial non-infringing uses, the 
District Court endorsed the heightened knowledge stan-
dard used by the Ninth Circuit in Napster and required 
that the defendants have "(1) specific knowledge of 
infringement at a time at which they contribute to the 
infringement, and (2) fail to act upon that informa-
tion. "25 The court did not immediately answer the ques-
tion about the knowledge standard, but decided against 
contributory liability, because the decentralised nature 
of the Grokster operation made it impossible to argue 
that there was material contribution by the defendants 
to the infringing activity.26 For similar reasons, a claim to 
establish vicarious liability failed as well.27 The conclu-
sion shows that the court came to its decision not with-
out regrets, stating that it was "not blind to the possibil-
ity that Defendants may have intentionally structured 
their businesses to avoid secondary liability for copy-
right infringement, while benefiting financially from the 
illicit draw of their wares." The court found it impossi-
ble, however, to "expand existing copyright law beyond 
its well-drawn boundaries" and relied as justification on 
a well-known deference to legislative reform from the 
Sony case: 
"The judiciary'S reluctance to expand the protections 
afforded by the copyright without explicit legislative 
guidance is a recurring theme ... Sound policy, as well as 
history, supports our consistent deference to Congress 
when major technological innovations alter the market 
for copyright materials. Congress has the constitu-
tional authority and the institutional ability to accom-
modate fully the raised permutations of competing 
interests that are inevitably implicated by such new 
technology. In a case like this, in which Congress has 
not plainly marked our course, we must be circumspect 
in constructing the scope of rights created by a legisla-
tive enactment which never calculated such a calculus 
of interests. "28 
b) Appeal Court Approaches 
On appeal, the decision was confirmed by the Ninth Cir-
cuit.29 In commenting on the Sony standard, the court 
rejected the copyright owners argument placing the 
emphasis on the extent of the infringement and evidence 
that the vast majority of the software use is for copyright 
infringement. According to the Ninth Circuit, this argu-
ment "misapprehends the Sony standard as construed in 
Napster I, which emphasized that in order for limita-
tions imposed by Sony to apply, a product need only be 
capable of substantial non infringing uses." 30 
aa) 7th Circuit: Magnitude of Infringing Use and Wilful 
Blindness as Knowledge 
In an interesting footnote, the court then commented on 
the decision of the Seventh Circuit in Re: Aimster Copy-
right Litigation.3! In this case, the Seventh Circuit had 
interpreted Sony in a way that was more conducive to 
the interests of the copyright owners. The court shifted 
the analysis away from knowledge towards the extent of 
the infringement: "What is true is that when a supplier is 
offering a product or service that has noninfringing as 
well as infringing uses, some estimate of the respective 
magnitudes of these uses is necessary for a finding of 
contributory infringement."32 Judge Richard Posner, 
who wrote the opinion, also rejected an attempt by 
Aimster, to rely on the lack of actual knowledge of the 
infringing activities. Instead he found that "wilful blind-
ness is knowledge in copyright law (where indeed it may 
be enough that the defendant should have known of the 
direct infringement)."33 He then provided an interesting 
comparison with the criminal law of aiding and abet-
ting: 
"A retailer of slinky dresses is not guilty of aiding and 
abetting prostitution even if he knows that some of his 
customers are prostitutes - he may even know which 
ones are ... The extent to which his activities and those of 
similar sellers actually promote prostitution is likely to 
be slight relative to the social costs of imposing a risk of 
prosecution on him. But the owner of a massage parlor 
who employs women who are capable of giving mas-
sages, but in fact as he knows sell only sex and never 
massage to their customers, is an aider and abettor of 
prostitution. " 
And returning to the issue of infringing and non-infring-
ing uses in copyright, he continued: 
"To the recording industry, a single known infringing 
use brands the facilitator as a contributory infringer. To 
the Aimsters of this world, a single noninfringing use 
provides complete immunity from liability. Neither is 
correct." 
bb) 9th Circuit: Broader Reading of Sony-Beta max 
The Ninth Circuit Court in the Grokster appeal dis-
agreed: " ... Aimster is premised specifically on a funda-
22 J. C. Ginsburg/S. Ricketson, "Inducers and authorisers: A comparison of 
the US Supreme Court's Grokster decision and the Australian Federal 
Court's KaZaa ruling", (2006) 11 Media and Arts Law Review, p. 4. 
23 For detailed discussions of this technology and the similar technology in 
the Australian Kazaa case, see the decisions at first instance in Grokster, 
259 F.Supp.2d 1029 at 1039-1041 and in Kazaa, Universal Music Aus-
tralia Pty Ltd v. Sharman License Holdings Ltd [2005] FCA 1242 (5 
September 2005), pp.33-45. See also R. Giblin-ChenIM. Davison, 
"Kazaa goes the way of Grokster? Authorisation of copyright infringe-
ment via peet-to-peer networks in Australia', (2006) 17 AlP] 53, 
pp.56-58. 
24 259 F.Supp.2d 1029. This case was originally consolidated with a fur-
ther action taken by professional songwriters and music publishers 
against Kazaa BV (under its original name of Consumer Empowerment 
BV), but Kazaa BV failed to defend this action after it sold its operations 
to Sharman Networks, which later became the defendant in the Austra-
lian P2P litigation. 
25 Ibid., at 1036. 
26 Ibid., at 1038-1043. 
27 Ibid., at 1043-1046. 
28 Ibid., at 1046. 
29 380 F.3d 1154. 
30 Ibid_, at 1162. 
31 334 F.3d 643. 
32 Ibid., at 649. 
33 Ibid., at 650. 
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mental disagreement with Napster I's reading of Sony-
Betamax. We are not free to reject our own Circuit's 
binding precedent ... Even if we were free to do so, we do 
not read Sony-Betamax's holding as narrowly as does 
the Seventh Circuit." 34 Thus, finding that the Grokster 
technology was capable of substantial non-infringing 
uses, the court confirmed the District Court's finding 
based on lack of specific knowledge of the infringement, 
lack of material contribution and lack of arguments to 
impose vicarious liability. As the District Court, the 
Ninth Circuit concluded that the correct balance 
between new technology and copyright principles was a 
matter for Congress and not for the courts. Different 
from the District Court, however, the Ninth Circuit was 
less apologetic about the outcome: 
"The Copyright Owners urge a re-examination of the 
law in light of what they believe to be proper public pol-
icy, expanding exponentially the reach of the doctrines 
of contributory and vicarious copyright infringement. 
Not only would such a renovation conflict with binding 
precedent, it would be unwise. Doubtless, taking that 
step would satisfy the Copyright Owners' immediate 
economic aims. However, it would also alter general 
copyright law in profound ways with unknown ultimate 
consequences outside the present context."35 
Besides, new technologies were always disruptive to old 
markets, but history had shown that time and market 
forces often provided equilibrium in balancing interests. 36 
c) The Sony Doctrine and its Interpretations at 
Appeal Court Level 
Thus, while the Ninth Circuit provided an interpretation 
ofthe Sony Doctrine that stressed the word "capable" in 
"capable of substantial noninfringing uses", the Seventh 
Circuit focused on the requirement that such uses be 
"substantial". The first interpretation is broader and 
facilitates the imposition of the restrictive Sony standard 
on copyright owners, which works ultimately in favour 
of the technology sector. The second, narrower interpre-
tation is less exculpating for new technologies, thus 
favouring the copyright owners. Equally, on the aspect 
of knowledge, the Ninth Circuit required "reasonable 
knowledge of specific infringing activities" while "wil-
ful blindness" is all that the Seventh Circuit required.37 
The outcome of the Grokster appeal was disappointing 
from the viewpoint of the recording industry. While the 
case was appealed further to the US Supreme Court and 
with the ultimate outcome in the US in the balance, the 
recording industry simultaneously pursued different 
~trategies such as suing individual P2P users for direct 
Infnngement, litigating in other countries with similar 
services such as Australia and taking action against 
34 380 F.3d 1154, at 1162,fn. 9. 
35 Ibid., at 1166. 
36 ibid., at 1167. 
37 ].M. Moye, "How Sonv Survived: Peer-to-Peer Software, Grokster, and 
Contributory Copyright Liability in the Twenty-First Century", 84 
N.C.L. Rev 646, pp. 670-671. 
38 Ibid., p. 672, fn. 173. 
39 125 S. Ct. 2764, at 2780. 
40 R. Giblin-Chen, "Rewinding Sony: An Inducement Theory of Second-
ary Liability', E.l.P.R. 2005, 27{ 11),428-436, at 431. 
41 125 S. Ct. at 2778. 
42 Ihid., at 2779. 
43 Ibid., at 2773. 
44 Ibid., at 2781. 
4S Ibid., at 2773 and 2781. 
other potential contributors such as companies that pro-
vided financial support for a contributing and vicarious 
infringer.38 
d) U.S. Supreme Court's Approach 
In Sony, the US Supreme Court had imported the "staple 
article of commerce" from patent law to limit copyright 
liability, In its appeal decision in Grokster, the court bor-
rowed again from patent law by enunciating its induce-
ment doctrine: " ... one who distributes a device with the 
object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as 
shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps 
taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting 
acts of infringement by third parties."w Apart from hav-
ing found statutory expression in US patent law, how-
ever, the inducement doctrine is also a return to earlier 
principles applied in copyright law.41l While the Supreme 
Court upheld the Sony doctrine, the Ninth Circuit read~ 
ing was found to be erroneous. Sony merely barred sec-
ondary liability based on presuming or imputing intent 
to cause infringement solely from the design or distribu-
tion of a product, capable of substantial lawful use, 
which the distributor knows is in fact used for infringe-
ment. However, the Ninth Circuit read Sony to mean 
that whenever a product is capable of substantial lawful 
use, the producer can never be held contributorily liable 
for third parties' infringing use of it, even when an actual 
purpose to cause infringing use is shown by evidence 
independent of design and distribution, unless there is 
specific knowledge of infringement at a time of the con-
tribution to the infringement and failure to act upon that 
information.41 This reading was clearly too broad and it 
was held that nothing in Sony required courts to ignore 
evidence of intent, if there is such evidence. Sony was 
never meant to foreclose rules of fault-based liability 
derived from the common lawY 
There was ample evidence to come to the conclusion that 
Grokster had actively induced infringement of copy-
right. The court concentrated on three features of this 
evidence. 
I> First, when the demise of Napster was imminent, 
Grokster had taken steps to capture the Napster 
network of users and to become the next Napster. 
This is why the name Grokster was chosen and this 
is why StreamCast initially operated with Open-
Nap, software specifically designed to "leverage 
Napster's 50 million user base. "4.\ There were also 
attempts by Grokster to divert queries for Napster 
onto its own website. Overall, the court concluded 
that "Grokster and Stream Cast's efforts to supply 
services to former Napster users, deprived of a 
mechanism to copy and distribute what were over-
whelmingly infringing files, indicate a principal, if 
not exclusive intent on the part of each to bring 
about infringement."44 
I> Second, there was no evidence that the Grokster 
defendants had attempted to develop filtering tools 
or other mechanisms to diminish the infringing activ-
ity using their software. In fact, they had rejected 
offers by another company to help monitor infringe-
ment4 ' 
I> Third, the company's business plan relied on the sell-
ing of advertising space and on high-volume use 
related to infringing activities. 
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As the court pointedly remarked: "While there is doubt-
less some demand for free Shakespeare, the evidence 
shows that substantive volume is a function of free 
access to copyrighted work. "46 Important for future 
cases seeking to rely on the guidance provided by Groks-
ter, the court declared that the latter two features of evi-
dence seen in isolation were not sufficient to justify an 
inference of unlawful intent, but they had to be viewed in 
the context of the entire record and by taking into 
account other evidence of intentY This has meanwhile 
led to some speculation, how different combinations of 
evidence might play out in future cases48 and how active 
a producer/distributor of technology needs to be to 
avoid secondary liability.49 
The US Supreme Court refused to be drawn into a dis-
cussion about the future interpretation of the Sony stan-
dard. The decision itself was unanimous based on the 
inducement doctrine, but Justices Ginsburg and Breyer 
(each joined by two other judges) filed concurring opin-
ions, which offered different interpretations of Sony, 
thus the divide about the issue continues, even within the 
ranks of the Supreme Court. 
ID. P2P litigation in Australia 
The recording industry took action against the compa-
nies operating the Kazaa system in Australia at a time 
of considerable frustration about the Grokster litiga-
tion following the decisions at District Court and 
Court of Appeal level (see IL2.c] above). In early 2004, 
30 sound recording companies led by Universal Music 
Australia Pty Ltd took action in the Australian Federal 
Court against Sharman License Holdings and its asso-
ciated companies as well as their directors and techni-
cians. The applicants based their claims inter alia on 
infringement of copyright by communication and 
authorisation of infringement, on joint tortfeasorship, 
on the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and the Fair 
Trading Act 1987 (NSW) as well as on the tort of con-
spiracy. 
1. Available Evidence 
Substantial evidence was secured at an early stage of the 
proceedings by means of Anton Piller orders and pre-
trial discovery and the taking of evidence continued until 
December 2004. However, in spite of all the evidence 
and a very detailed discussion of the technical features of 
the Kazaa system, the court remained somewhat unsure 
about the existence of a central server, because of a joint 
venture agreement between Sharman and affiliate Altnet 
that allowed Altnet to provide licensed and authorised 
material on response to search requests via a function 
called TopSearch. TopSearch, the court found, was a 
central server, in the relevant sense, but only in respect of 
so-called 'gold files' (files displaying a gold icon for 
licensed and authorised material). As for 'blue files', 
which according to the evidence consisted largely of 
copyright infringing material the court concluded that 
although there was reason "to suspect that there is, 
indeed, a Kazaa server that is capable of doing the same 
thing in relation to blue files", the court was not pre-
pared to make such a finding.·m Equally, the court 
remained unsure that a source code studied by expert 
witnesses was identical to that actually used by Shar-
man.>! 
2. Federal Court's Approach 
The court dismissed the claims based on the Trade Prac-
tices Act, conspiracy and infringement by communica-
tion and concentrated on the "more realistic" claim52 
that the respondents authorised users to infringe the 
applicants copyright in their sound recordings. The Aus-
tralian Copyright Act provides definitions of the exclu-
sive rights of copyright owners and of infringements in 
Part III of the legislation for original literary, dramatic, 
musical and artistic works and in Part IV for subject-
matter other than works, including sound recordings. 
S. 101(1) states that copyright in Part IV matter is 
infringed by a person who, not being the owner of the 
copyright and without the licence of the owner of the 
copyright, does in Australia, or authorizes the doing in 
Australia, of any act comprised in the copyright. Further 
guidance in deciding on the issues of authorisation is 
provided by s. 101(1A), which was introduced by the 
Copyright (Digital Agenda) Amendment Act 2000. 
Accordingly, the following must be taken into account in 
deciding the question of authorisation: 
(a) the extent (if any) of the person's power to prevent 
the doing of the act concerned; 
(b) the nature of any relationship existing between the 
person and the person who did the act concerned; 
(c) whether the person took any other reasonable steps 
to prevent or avoid the doing of the act, including 
whether the person complied with any relevant 
industry codes of practice. 
a) Pre-Existing Case Law 
In line with cases such as University of New South Wales 
v. Moorhouse,s3 authorisation was 'held to have its dic-
tionary meaning of "sanction, approve, countenance.'" 
Nevertheless, one issue that arose in the case was the 
relationship of s. 101(1A) to pre-existing case law. In 
comparison to US law, case law in both Australia and the 
UK has put less emphasis on the element of knowledge 
and instead has focused on the control exercised by the 
authorising party. The court reviewed the decision in 
Adelaide Corporation v. Australasian Performing Right 
Association Limited (1928) 40 CLR, later invoked in 
theMoorhouse decision, where it was held that "a per-
son cannot be said to authorize an infringement of copy-
right unless he has some power to prevent it." The same 
decision was also cited for the further principles that 
express or formal permission or sanction, or active con-
duct indicating approval, is not essential to constitute an 
authorization and that the word "authorize" connotes a 
mental element and it could not be inferred that a person 
had, by mere inactivity, authorized something to be done 
46 Ibid., at 2774 and 2782. 
47 Ibid., p. 2781, fn. 12 and p. 2782, fu. 13. 
48 See R. Giblin-Chen, "Rewinding Sony: An Inducement Theory of Sec· 
ondary Liability', E.I.P.R. 2005, 27(11), pp. 434-435;}.C Ginsburg/S. 
Ricketson, "Inducers and authorisers: A comparison of the US Supreme 
Court's Grokster decision and the Australian Federal Court's KaZaa 
ruling", (2006) 11 Media and Arts Law Review, pp. 7-8. 
49 R. Giblin-Chen, "Rewinding Sony: An Inducement Theory of Second-
ary Liability" E.!.P.R. 2005, 27(11), p. 433. 
50 Unillersai Music Australia Pty Ltd l'. Sharman License Holdings Ltd 
[20051 FCA 1242, para. 235. 
51 Ibid., para. 224. 
52 See the court's own summary of the decision. 
53 (1975) 133 CLR 1. 
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if he neither knew nor had reason to suspect that the act 
might be done.54 Later decisions stressing the element of 
control and discussed by the Federal Court apart from 
Moorhouse included Australian Tape Manufacturers 
Association Ltd v. Commonwealth of Australia,s5 Aus-
tralasian Performing Rights Association Ltd v. Metro on 
George Pty Ltd56 and CBS Songs Ltd v. Armstrad Con-
sumer Electronics PLC.57 Of these, the Armstrad deci-
sion comes closest to the US Sony standard by requiring 
that "inducement, incitement or persuasion to infringe 
must be by a defendant to an individual infringer and 
must identifiably procure a particular infringement in 
order to make the defendant liable as a joint infringer. "58 
b) Effect of Introduced Statutory Law 
Arguably, the wording used in s. 101(lA) of the Copy-
right Act (" ... the extent [if any] of the person's power ... ) 
indicates that a person may be liable for authorising 
infringement even in the absence of control and it 
thereby widens the net to catch the authoriser.59 Not sur-
prisingly, the applicants argued that the statutory provi-
sion superseded the previous case law,60 whereas counsel 
for Sharman insisted on the continuing relevance of the 
previous case law and maintained that s. 101(lA) was 
"an inclusive, not exhaustive, list. "61 Considering these 
arguments and the continuing relevance of the case law, 
Justice Wilcox held: 
"1 accept that the intention behind the addition of s. 
101(lA) to the Act was to elucidate, rather than to vary, 
the pre-existing law about authorisation. I further accept 
... the continuing applicability of the Moorhouse test. A 
claim of authorisation can be made good only where it is 
shown that the person has sanctioned, approved or coun-
tenanced the infringement. It is not essential there be 
direct evidence of the person's attitude; as Gibbs J said in 
Moorhouse, inactivity or indifference, exhibited by acts of 
commission or omission, may reach such a degree as to 
support an inference or authorisation."62 
As for an attempt by Sharman to rely on the safe harbour 
provision of s. 112E Copyright Act that the provision of 
facilities is not enough to constitute authorisation, Jus-
tice Wilcox found that the provision applied to Sharman 
and that it was intended by Parliament to 'protect the 
messenger', although only to the extent indicated by the 
Act. However, on his findings, Sharman is and was more 
54 Ibid., para. 367. 
55 (1993) 176 CLR 480. 
56 (2004) 61 IPR 575. 
57 [1988J 1 AC 1013. 
58 Cited in Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v. Sharman License Hold-
ings Ltd [2005J FCA 1242, para. 377. . . 
59 In COntrast to this, the Explanatory Memorandum to the DIgItal Agenda 
Bill explained that the new statutory provisions on authorisation essen-
tiaUy codified principles developed in the earlier cases and were meant to 
provide legislative certainty about liability for authorisation, see rC. 
Ginsburg/S. Ricketson, ~ Inducers and authorisers: A comparison of the 
US Supreme Court's Grokster decision and the Australian Federal Court's 
KaZaa ruling", (2006) 11 Media and Arts Law Review, pp. 13-14. 
60 Unil'ersal Music Allstralia Pty Ltd l'. Sharman License Holdmgs Ltd 
[20051 FCA 1242, para. 360. 
61 Ibid., para. 372. 
62 Ibid., para. 402. 
63 Ibid., para. 418. 
64 Ibid., para. 404. 
65 Ibid., para. 405. 
66 Ibid., para. 407. 
67 Ibid., para. 520. 
than a messenger.63 
c) Liability for Authorisation of Copyright 
Infringement 
Justice Wilcox summarised his findings of liability for 
authorisation of copyright infringement of six of the ten 
respondents as follows: 
"At all material times, it has been in Sharman's financial 
interest for there to be ever-increasing file-sharing, 
involving an ever greater number of people. Sharman 
always knew users were likely to share files that were 
subject to copyright .... "64 
"In the present case, the applicants are able to point to 
evidence of positive acts by Sharman that would have 
had the effect of encouraging copyright infringement. 
These acts include: 
(i) Sharman's website promotion of KMD as a file-
sharing facility ... 
(ii) Sharman's exhortations to users to use this facility 
and share their files ... 
(iii) Sharman's promotion of the 'Join the Revolution' 
movement, which is based on file-sharing, espe-
cially of music, and which scorns the attitude of 
record and movie companies in relation to their 
copyright works ... "65 
And on the effectiveness of Kazaa's warnings to its users 
not to infringe copyright and similar provisions in the 
End User Licence Agreement (EULA): 
"It is difficult to believe those directing the affairs of 
Sharman, or any other of the respondents, ever thought 
these measures would be effective to prevent, or even 
substantially curtail, copyright file-sharing. It would 
have been obvious to them that, were those measures to 
prove effective, they would greatly reduce Kazaa's 
attractiveness to users and, therefore, its advertising 
potential. " 
On being presented with a report that concluded that 
Kazaa was predominantly used for unauthorised file 
sharing of copyrighted material, "those directing the 
affairs of Sharman (and Altnet) could not have done oth-
erwise than appreciate that, notwithstanding what was 
on the website, copyright infringement was rife. Despite 
this, Sharman took no steps to include a filtering mecha-
nism in its software, even in software intended to be pro-
vided to new users. There is no credible evidence that fil-
tering was ever discussed. "66 
Such filtering mechanisms for infringing material, the 
court had earlier concluded, would not be 100 % effec-
tive, but would still go far to protect copyright owners. 
As a consequence, the Federal Court restrained the 
respondents from further authorising Kazaa users to 
infringe the applicants copyrights, but allowed the sys-
tem to be modified by implementing two alternat.ive 
solutions for filtering. In recognising the general usetul-
ness of the technology, Justice Wilcox said that there 
should be an opportunity for the respondents to modify 
the Kazaa system, so as to protect the applicants' copy-
right interests, but without intruding on others' freedom 
of speech and communication. The evidence about vari-
ous filtering methods had indicated how this might be 
done.67 The decision is currently on appeal to the Full 
Bench of the Federal Court. 
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IV. Conclusion 
Despite the absence of an equivalent to the Sony doctrine 
in Australia and significant differences between the legal 
frameworks for their orders a well as factual differences 
that prompted Justice Wilcox to disregard the parallel 
running Grokster proceedings as "of little assistance to 
me" ,68 there are many similarities in the reasoning of the 
US Supreme Court ruling in Grokster and the Australian 
Federal Court decision in the Kazaa case. In both cases, 
the principal reasons for the decision are advertising and 
active encouragement of the infringements, insufficient 
evidence of filtering and business plans that rely on 
advertising income and high-volume usage of copyright 
infringing material. Ginsburg and Ricketson believe that 
the absence of the Sony standard may make things easier 
for copyright owners in Australia.69 The Kazaa decision 
is currently on appeal. The recording industry repre-
sentatives have indicated that they intend to claim dam-
ages if they are successful at the appeal stage. This may 
well lead to new controversies given the huge differ-
ences in estimating the effects of P2P networks on the 
sales record of the industry. Only time will tell how 
effective these decisions really are and the capacity of 
Kazaa style operations to get around newly imposed 
legal restrictions cannot be underestimated. For the 
moment, however, it appears as if the recording indus-
try and associated copyright owners have won a few 
major battles. 
68 Ibid., para. 29-30. 
69 ]. C. Ginsburg/S. Ricketson, "Inducers and authorisers: A comparison of 
the US Supreme Court's Grokster decision and the Australian Federal 
Court's KaZaa ruling", (2006) 11 Media and Arts Law Review, p. 23. 
['-I Case Law 
17 U.S.c. § 107 
Editor's Headnotes 
1. There is no likelihood of proving that Google's 
framing of and in-line linking to infringing (full-size) 
copies of copyrighted images constitutes a public dis-
play or distribution rendering Google liable for direct 
infringement. 
2. In contrast, there is a likelihood of proving that 
Google's creation and public display of thumbnails 
directly infringes copyrighted material without fall-
ing under the fair use exception. 
3. Because third-party websites at which direct 
infringement is taking place appear entirely indepen-
dent of Google Image Search, it is 
a) neither likely that Google's AdSense program will 
be found to materially contribute to such direct 
infringement (contributory infringement) 
b) nor likely that Google has right and ability to con-
trol such infringing activity (vicarious infringement). 
District Court Central District of California, decision of 
17 February 2006 by A. Howard Matz, Judge 
Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., et al. [Case No. CV 04-9484 
AHM (SHx)/ 
Facts 
The principal two-part issue in this case arises out of the increas-
ingly recurring conflict between intellectual property rights on 
the one hand and the dazzling capacity of internet technology to 
assemble, organize, store, access, and display intellectual prop-
erty "content n an the other hand. That issue, in a nutshell, is: does 
a search engine infringe copyrighted images when it displays 
them on an "image search" function in the form of "thumbnails" 
but not infringe when, through in-line linking, it displays copy-
righted images served by another website? 
Plaintiff Perfect 10, Inc. ("P 10") filed separate suits against 
Google, Inc. and against Amazon.com, Inc. and its subsidiary, 
A9.com, Inc.1 (collectively, "Amazon"), alleging copyright and 
trademark infringement and various related claims. The suits 
were consolidated. P 10 moves now for a preliminary injunction 
against both Defendants, solely on the basis of its copyright 
claims. P 10 seeks to prevent Defendants' image search engines 
from displaying "thumbnail" copies ofP 10's copyrighted images 
and also from linking to third-party websites which host and 
serve infringing full-size images. ( ... ) 
Analysis 
P 10 asserts that Google is both directly and secondar-
ily liable for copyright infringement. P 10 alleges that 
Google's image search engine directly infringes by 
copying, distributing, and displaying thumbnails and 
full-size images of P 10's copyrighted photographs. P 
10 alleges that Google is secondarily liable for the 
actions of third-party websites that host infringing 
images and unauthorized perfectlO.com usernamel 
password combinations to which Google's search 
engine links, as well for the actions of individuals who 
are led by Google Image Search to infringing images 
and subsequently download infringing copies them-
selves. 
Google raises several defenses. First, in response to 
P 1 D's direct infringement claims, it argues that (1) many 
of its actions do not infringe upon any of the exclusive 
rights granted to the owner of a copyright, and (2) to the 
extent that its actions do implicate those rights, such use 
is fair under 17 U.s.c. § 107. Second, in response to 
P 1 D's secondary liability claims, Google contends that 
(1) it has not contributorily or vicariously infringed; (2) 
it is immune from contributory liability under Sony 
Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 
U.S.417 (1984) [hereinafter "Sony"]; and (3) it qualifies 
for protection under the various safe harbor provisions 
oftheDMCA, 17U.S.C. § 512(a)-(d). 
1 A9.com is Amazon.com's search website. 
